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ABSTRACT
Interpersonal communication is a two-way process;
upward as well a$ downward. In any communication net-
work, potential barriers exist which would deter and in-
hibit the free flow of information through the network.
The Navy, as a typical bureaucratic structure, has offi-
cially designated channels of communication within its
organization. Whether these channels are adequate for
upward communication (from subordinate to superior) is
the problem explored in this study. In this paper, the
inter- related theories concerning the field of communica-
tion are discussed; among them, cybernetics and informa-
tion theory. Scholarly studies of psychologists and
sociologists are-examined, relating them to a Navy situ-
ation. Parallels from the formal studies to the mili-
tary situation were sought in an effort to find ways of
determining and eliminating barriers to upward communica-
tion in the Navy. The study indicates that interpersonal
skills are essential to the military leader seeking a co-
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CHAPTER I
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
One of the fundamental requirements for a healthy organi-
zation is the ability of its members to convey information,
opinion, direction, guidance, admonishment, and praise to
one another in an interaction of behavior known generically as
communication. Communication can be in the form of oral or
written words; it can be implied by a look, gesture or even
the absence of such conduct. Communication can perform vari-
ous functions: the administrative function in which control
and direction are £$ercised; the information function where
the purpose is to report, analyze, explain, describe or even
ask a question; and the instructive function where the com-
muj ' t'fctf is showing or telling how to perform an action of
some sort. By no means is communication pure; that is , a
mixture of many functions can be found in one message, as can
be seen in ^very day life wherein interpersonal relation-
ships overlap.
I. THE PROBLEM
Statement of the Problem
While communication of the interpersonal type is usually
thought of in terms of what management is trying to get across
to employees, there is a reverse flow of information up the
chain of command. This is the feedback needed by management
to see the effects | of policy, sense the morale of the group,
and generally keep a finger on the pulse of the entire organi-
zation.

This is "upward communication^. The barriers in the path
of clear communication of subordinate to superior are the
specific subject of the analysis of this paper. Some of
the questions for which answers will be sought are: the
factors and causes which constitute barriers in the upward
communication process; the relevance of these barriers to
problems in upward coiTimundte&fcion; what specific processes
may be utilized to eliminate such barriers; and the practices
which will stimulate and encourage the flow of upward communi-
cation in a given organization. With respect to military
application, the study will consider problems of military
hierarchy, attendant blocks to effective upward communcation
and will attempt to draw inference and parallel from studies
in the area of organizational interpersonal communication
applicable to Navy situations.
Importance of the Study
The contribution of this research to the knowledge about
the communication process will be primarily one of collation;
the gathering together of pertinent writings and research
about communication and its allied fields of study, relating
thern to a military situation, and drawing conclusions based
upon this application. The writer has searched through the
facilities of the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School Library,
as well as the library of the U. S. Army Human Resources
Research Unit, Monterey, to find materials which directly
applied the effect of the military hierarchy structure on
interpersonal communication within it. The Bureau of Naval

Personnel and the Naval Personnel Research Activities in
Washington and San Diego were also contacted for this in-
formation. So far as is known at these activities, no
studies are on file having to do with causes or answers to
the interpersonal communication problem in the Navy.
Research Significance
Too often military personnel, and especially career
officers, consider themselves apart from the rest of society
in many ways. We often hear the expression, "the right way,
the wrong way and the Navy way". By so thinking, the value
of behavioral research may be largely ignored as pertaining
to "others". One of the aimitt of this study is an attempt to
apply basic principles of research to a strictly military
situation and draw therefrom subsequent conclusions, hoping
to point officer thinking in these directions. Our society
becomes more and more interdependent as science and tech-
nology develop; the image of the military officer as a
"spit-aad-polish robot" cannot long endure under such press-
ures. In order to join society, the military organization
must contribute to eociety's concept of itself by partici-
pation and stronger identification. As a step in this pro-
cess, isolation from such basic organizational concepts as
the human communication process is explored and analyzed in
this study.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Interpersonal comiuunication is one facet of an extremely

diverse field of science involving many disciplines. Broad-
ly defined, "communication" would include any means which
links one mechanism or organism with another. Within this
frame of reference can come such strange companions as music,
art, speech, computers, telephones, newspapers, or even a
guided missile. Because of its diversities, the simple word
"communication" is no longer amenable to specific, concrete
concepts in every field of interest; it can only be used as
a generic term. Some of the theories which ha-ve sprung up
about this word and its applications will be defined and
briefly discussed in this study. This will acquaint the
reader with the breadth of content which serves as background
and foundation for the study of interpersonal, or social (as
it is sometimes called) communication. The fields of interest
presented here are by no means a complete roster, but they
are those which seem to bear most directly on and have in-
fluenced most the subject of primary consideration for this
research.
Information Theory
Information theory (or as some writers use in a synon-
ymous way, communication theory) is largely the brain-child
of two mathematicians, Norbert Wijbper and Claude Shannon.
Although their efforts were independent of one another, they
arrived at basically the same conclusions. To a large extent,
they were indebted to the earlier work of R. A. Fisher, a
British sfittt&ijjtician, through whorne the word "information"
became a technical term. He measured how much a sample, or

a statistic based on that sample, contributed to his over-
all decision; this measure was a quantitative amount of
(Cherry, 1957)
"information".
Information theory as a mathematical theory of communi-
cation, is based primarily on the probabilities with which
eertain messages vzill be transmitted through communication
channels from the source to the receiver. T->e sample space
is the extent, or range of all possible messages which might
be transmitted. The theory deals with a system in which an
"information" source" (device or person which produces messages
to be transmitted) emits signals through the "channel" over
which these messages are transmitted to the receiving point.
Statistical inference enters the picture since the system has
potential for error; it is probable that the message which
originated at the source will not be exactly that which
arrives at the receiver. There are, at best, minor disturban-
ces which cause inexact or inefficient transmission or re-
ception. These are called "noise". At the end of our communi-
cation system is a translation, or decoding, device which
infers, from the message received, and in spite of the noise
encountered in the system, what the original message probably
was. Since the disturbances causing irregularity or "gar-
bling" in the message are random, this becomes a problem for
statistical inference, or one involving probabilities. Re-
dundancy is a property of languages, codes and sign systems
which arises from using different combinations to transmit

the same idea, and which facilitates communication in spite
of all the factors of uncertainty acting against it. Thus,
redunduancy becomes a protective device against noise in a
communication system, thereby increasing the probabilities
of an original message arriving in its form. Thus, communi-
cation theory deals with both the number of messages trans-
mitted and how accurately these messages are received.
The relation of information theory to this study is
basic. Interpersonal communication is a system, also; it is
convenient to use information theory Lcr is when referring to
this system. For example, our system has its "source" in the
communicator, or person transmitting a message through a
"channel" (air or piece of paper) to another person or group
of persons which become the "receivers" and consequent de-
coders of the message. "Noise" also enters the interpersonal
communication system in the form of semantic difficulties be-
tween the sender and receiver, or inattention, or a host of
other barriers to efficient communication. Our system's pro-
tection against the effects of noise is also a form of redun-
dancy. For example, the sentence "All superfluous illumination
shall be extinguished" might produce noise in some communi-
cation systems; therefore, a form of redundancy would be to
repeat the message in other code form, such as ! A 1 unneces-
sary light shall be turned off". This study will show other
forms of noise and redundancy in iv,1_ r»r-personal communications
systems, and also make reference to research projects which
have used the discipline <of statistical inference when

deriving workable theses concerning these variables.
Cybernetics
"Cybernetics is the science of communication and con-
(Beer, 1959)
trol," Rorbert ifjMfener originated the name from
the Greek word for pilot or helmsman, and he defines it as
"a study of messages which control action". Basically, this
relatively new science is concerned with adapting the prin-
cipal functions of the human brain to the operation of complex
machines, such as the computer. The most effective mechanism
known for compilation and processing o* information and the
use of that information is the human brain, Cyberneticians
attempt to relate the human nervous system to the electrical-
mechanical system of a machine which will be able to function
in much the same way. Cybernetics has to do with the communi-
cation between man and machine and between machine and machine.
Fundamental to this science's principles is the concept of
"feedback" or a control process which indicates to the man
or machine the quality and effect of performance. Feedback
acts as a controllings nechanism in the same sense that ho-
meostasis operates in the human body. For instance, the sense
of balance in the human being is controlled by the inner ear's
equilibrium function. Tie nerve impulses to this control-
center establish whether the individual is or is not in
equilibrium. This feedback stimulates muscle reaction which
corrects for any disequalibrium, again sending a signal to
the inner ear and so on throughout a continuous cycle which

achieves that state we cell "balance". T^e same type of op-
eration can be observed in the homeostatic devices designed
by cyberneticians as they seek to devise ways in which a
mechanical system can ciange state with a change of informa-
tion given the system and then respond to correct any devia-
tions which may appear in the behavior pattern established by
repetition of change in state. Even today there are machines
which are capable of great complexities in goal- seeking be-
havior, using this homeostatic concept of control through
feedback, in much the same fashion as human beings. (The one
barrier not crossed is the one of abstract thought; it is be-
lieved that machines will never reach man's power in this
respect).
Cybernetics plays an important role in the concepts in-
herent in the field of interpersonal, as well as that of
mechanical communication. Particularly in the area of feed-
back we can see an application of control in communication.
The originator of a message must look at the results he ac-
tually has with his communication to find standards for mea-
surement of new attempts to communicate. Tie receiver's re-
sponse to a communication is the empirical standard for eval-
uating the originator's output. The response the receiver
makes is the feedback the originator gets from his communica|*\
(Thayer, 1961)
tion. Feedback is germane to the idea of upward
communication In organizations, for managers must be informed
as to the effect of their policies, decisions and directions






ua<>e g g Semantics
Usually, when we speak of communication, we are referr-
ing to verbal communication. Verbalizing means, necessarily,
the use of language, and language involves words and patterns
made up of word combinations. It is usually formal and com-
plex and suited to the culture of the group using it as a
communication tool. For example, it may be that English is
better adapted to experimentation with nuclear physics, but
Arabic has over 6,0000 different words for camel, its parts
(Chase, 1953)
and equipment!
- Language, or rather the use of it, serves as a stimulant
to communication; however, it is both facilitative and limit-
ing. To put it another way, the better the language, the
more effective the thought; the better the grasp and control
of language tools, the better the ability to conceptualize,
synthesize, j analyze and so on. One's command of a language
ensures his command of a more comprehensive mode of communi-
cation, and therefore makes his potential for effective
communication with others better.
The International Society for General Semantics has
issued a short definition of semantics: " Semantics ... The
(Chase, 1953)
systematic study of meaning." "Meaning" here
does not neceesarily mean the one given in a standard dic-
tionary; rather it has the connotation of "evaluation".
Korzybski, the late Polish semanticist, likened the relation
of language to reality with the relation of maps to the
territory they represent. (i) a map is not the territory

(words are not the tilings they represent); (?) a map does not
represent all of a territory (words cannot say all about any-
thing); (3) a map is self-reflexive, in the sense that an
ideal map would have to include a map of the map, which in
turn would have to include a map of the map of the map, etc.
(It is possible to speak words about words, words about words
about words, etc.; in terms of behavior this means that it is
possible to react to our reactions, react to our reactions to
our reactions, etc.). Evaluative habits based on these prem-
ises, Korzybski said, result in flexibility o^ mind, lack of
(Hayakawa, 1954)
dogmatism, emotional balance and maturity.
N^ When individuals come together to work on a problem, or
even to exchange ideas, they are dependent upon language as a
principal, if not exclusive, means of exchanging information,
opinion and suggestions. Semanticists warn us about some of
the weaknesses and distorting influences in the words we use.
As a simple example of the multitudinous number of meanings
for one word, the specific meaning of the word "slip" can mean,
- in common parlance:
fall ton the ice
a verbal indiscretion
a we .. an ' s garment
a surreptitious exchange of currency
a small piece of P?per
space for a siip
fabric cover for a pillow or furniture
to a ceramic engineer:
an aqueous suspension of potter's clay
10

- to an electrical engineer:
the difference between the speed o^ the rotor in
an induction motor and t ronous roopd.
Abstractions present special trouble i i communication;
meanings are ill-defined and even overlapping. Too o f ten
we find emotional overtones in such words as "democracy",
or "communist" and "free enterprise" and no one definition
acceptable to everyone. Consideration of the pitfalls extant
in everyday social communication because of semantic differ-
ences is a large factor in the entir« u " >rocess.
Organizational Theory
Every author has a slightly different perception of
the meaning and purpose of the "organization"; there are even
various schools of thought on the subject of the composition
and formation of organizations. There are, however, three of
these schools of thought which are presented as representa-
tive of the rn ' Lste :
\_ The Classical Lie o<> . c ai sical oint o r view holds
that work or tasks can be so organized as to accomplish ef-
ficiently the objectives of the organization. An organization
is vie-.; -? duct o rational thought concerned largely
with coordinating tasks through the use of "c iti aut 1 or-
ity. It is based on the fundamental and usually i ; icit
assumption that the behavior of people is logical, rational,
and within the same system of rationality as that used to
formulate the organization. It is an analytical approach
11

developing normative models. That is, on the basis of de-
duction from some assumptions it attempts to specif y.. v '.at an
(Litterer, 1963)
organization should be.
The Naturalistic School . Tie naturalistic or behavioral
point cf view has taken as its main topic of interest the
i
besavior of people in groups or collectivities. It holds that
organizations spring naturally or spontaneously from the asso-
ciation of people who have common, or mutually supporting
needs, interests, or objectives. Behavior of people in col-
lective environments tend to have a much broader and varied
det of behavior than is called for, or for that matter an-
(Litterer, 1963)
ticipated, in the classical point of view.
^
This would seem to be, in fact, the antithesis of the classi-
cal school; however, there is more to contend with than that.
Tj e &/rt- : go coof . T-ere h&s slowly but gradually
emerged yet a third viecj of organizations. This approach
looks on an organization as a system, (or perhaps part of a
system), of events, activities, and other components which
must exist if any objective is to be realized at all. This
point of view, in short, does not concern itself particularly
with how to accomplish a specific objective. Instead, it con-
cerns itself with identifying the basic facte frs and the liter-
relations between them necessary for any task or goal to be
accomplished.
Tiere is a general topic of organizations of which these
three views are but parts. In this paper, an organization is
considered £o be a "social unit within which people have
12

achieved somewhat stable relations among themselves in order
(Litterer,l963)
to facilitate obtaining a set of objectives or goals."
Interpersonal communication could be considered the life
blood of any organization; the thread knitting the members to-
gether. An organization can be thought of as having. two main
types of communication: the formal, and the informal. Formal
communication is that which follows the established channels
of communication and generally has a downward flow. Informal
communication, on the other hand, does not follow any set
pattern, but forms a channel(s) of its own in the paths of
least resistance. In the military situation, for example,
formal communication is accomplished by the Plan-of-the-Day
.
This document is published in order to give the precise or-
der and formula for each occurrence of the day to come, plus
any other information which is necessary for the organization
to know in advance. Informal communication in the Navy is
the familiar "scuttlebutt", or gossip- centered conversations
of the passageways and coffee-messes. It can also be the
very powerful tool of the skillful administrator who uses it
properly.
IScott (1961), mentions communication as one of the
three linking activities universal to human systems of organ-
ized behavior. Deutsch(195l) points out that organizations
are composed of parts which communicate with each other, re-
ceive messages from the outside world, and store information.
In each of the three major schools of thought on organi-
13

zation theory, interpersonal communication plays a part;
how much it is aelmowl edged and developed depends upon the
perception of the individual organization's leaders.
II I . SUMMARY
Wherever there are organizations there are communication
channels; whether they bo formal or informal, they pose cer-
tain problems to those in t e j.ga. L Lon. ow reliable the
channels in each organization are depends upon a group of
variables drawn from the fields of information theory,
cybernetics, semantics and organization theory itself. In
order to delineate the exact di tip ions of the problem ex-
plored in this stud)'', \-?<i must see t ul] background o^ its
context in t ;a other disciplines surroutpdJ , It. In other
words, it i.s not to plunge in and diagnose the
illness without first a history of t u patient.
The importance of Navy administrators examining the
question of upward communication hangs in the relevance of
all studies concerning human behavior or organisational i ter-
actions to the Navy's own organization and concept o manage-
ment. Tie modern Navy cannot afford to permit any relevant
study to be dismissed as not applicable; it must find
parallels^ within so that the Navy may continue to remain




REVIEW OF SELECTED STUDIES
The communication system in organization is often taken
for granted. Yet there is abundant evidence that communica-
tion in -lost organizations is not operating efficiently. If
we can learn what breakdowns occur and why, and what can be
done about it, organizational productivity may increase. It
is also possible to help people in organizations clear up
misunderstandings, reduce frustrations, and enhance the satis-
fying of personal needs.
The area of Interpersonal communication has stimulated
a number of scholars to conduct research products which
could serve as stepping stones to better understanding of this
subject. Some of these projects have direct relevance to
interpersonal communication within organizations. Others are
slanted to the communicator and/or the receiver concerning
characteristics they have or do not have with respect to their
ability to communicate effectively.
The studies selected for review in this chapter are con-
sidered by the writer to be representative of the great num-
ber to be found in research journals. It is not practicable
to incluqe the entire range of literature on the subject o^
interpersonal communication; therefore the selections that






In 1950, Alex Bavelas led the way in experimental studies
of the relative efficiency of task groups having different
types of communication nets. Bavelas created designs of
communication patterns, or nets, which impose strictly-con-
trolled communication channels upon experimental groups.
(See Figure 1.) A"circular" design permits each member to
communicate with only one member immediately to his right and
another immediate I}'- to his left. An "all-channels"design
permits each member to communicate with every other member.
A "wheel" design* makes one member a coordination center, and
all other members are able to communicate with only the cen-
tral, coordinative member. Bavelas found that groups with
w .eel designs quickly develop clearly defined role structures
with the coordinative member occupying the high status po-
(Bavelas, 1950)
siti<jn in the group.
Figure 1. Bavelas 1 communication net patterns. Left to right:
circular; all-channel; wheel
In these experiments, Bavelas was not designing literal
imitations of organizational channels; nevertheless, they do
approximate channels that are used in business organizations.
The "wheel" design simulates a department head and four
16

subordinates who report individually to him, The "circle"
might apply to the communication among peers at the same level
in the organization, whose most frequent communication con-
tacts are limited to the colleagues on each side of them.
Building on the pioneer work of Bavelas, Harold Leavitt
(1951) conducted further experiments with communication net-
works and their effect upon group performance. It was the
purpose of his investigation to explore the relationship be-
tween the behavior o r small groups and the patterns of communi-
cation in which the groups operated. He also considered the
pyschological conditions that are imposed on group members
by various communication patterns, and the effects of these
conditions on the organization and the behavior of its members.
Leavitt ^sed Bavelas 1 designs of communication nets and
ultimately found that a position o f central ity is an impor-
tant determinant of a member's success in achieving status in
a group. He also found that the behavioral difference of
accuracy, total activity, satisfaction of group members and
organization of the group were attributable to differences
in communication patterns. Also indicated, but not cor.c" :-
ly, were differences among patterns in speed of problem solving,
self-correcting tendencies, and cohesiveness.
In terms of what communication net proved "best",
Leavitt, using the two patterns of circle and wheel, found
that the wheel-r roup performed simple tasks best in
all respects, working faster and making fewer: errors than any
t -jj bther sets. The circle was the least efficient. The
17

organization of the wheel was almost immediate and proved
stable; no stable form o r organization was evident in groups
(Leavitt, 1951)
formed on the pattern of the circle.
These experiments were commented on by Bavelas and Bar-
ret (1951). In their article, the parallel was drawn be-
tween the communication networks of the experiments and the
complex systems which produce these networks in organizations*
An organizational system of communication is usually created
by explicit delegations of duties and formal systems o f re-
sponsibility. Implicitly, these categories include state-
ments o" the nature, content, and direction of the communi-
cation whid is considered necessary for the performance of
the group. Groups tend to depart ho sue1* oral state-
ments however, and create other channels o f communication.
In other words, informal organizational systems emerge.
In this function, Bavelas and Barrett contend that it
is entirely possible to view an organization as an elaborate
system : . |r.t ering, evaluating, recombining and dissemi-
nating information. It is not surprising, in these terms,
that the effectiveness of an organization with respect to the
achievement of its goals should be so closely related to its
effectiveness in handling information. In an enterprise
whose success hinges upon the coordination of t e ff forts
of all its members, the managers depend co pletely upor the
quality, the amount, and the rate at whicVi relevant informa-
tion reaches them. The rest of the organization, in turn,




This line of reasoning leads the authors of this article
to the belief that communication is not a secondary or de-
rived aspect of organization — a "helper" of the other
functions. Rather they describe it as the essence o £ org-
anized activity and is the basic process out of which all
other functions derive. The goals an organization selects,
the methods it applies, the effectiveness with which it im-
proves its own procedures — all o f these hinge upon the
quality and availability of the information in the system.
Tae article goes on to point out that laboratory experi-
ments can lead into systematic studies o^ actual operating
organizations. As the gap between laboratory and the organi-
zational applications becomes smaller, communications patterns
(Bavelas and Barrett,
will afford important insight for managers. 1951)
Hierarchical Concepts
An extension of the network concept initiated by Brvelas
and ^eavitt is the study of communication phenomena in ex-
perimental groups differentiated into high-status and low-
status subgroups. Harold Kelley (1951) conducted one of
the first of these studies. Kelley stated that the impor-
tance of research on the problem of status-differentiation
lies primarily in the numerical predominance of hierarchic
groups over undifferentiated ones in our culture. T\e purpose
of thft study was to determine some of the driving and re-
straining forces which act upon various communication content




Kelley made the following conclusions based on his ex-
perimental data:
1. The more unpleasant is a position in a
hierarchy, the stronger are the 'orces on
a person to communicate task- irrelevant
content,
. o . Irrelevant content is postulated
to serve the function of permitting the oc-
cupant of an undesirable position to escape
from it...
2. Communication serves as substitute for
real upward locomotion in the case of low-
status persons who have little or no possi-
bility of real locomotion.
. *^
3. Restraining forces act upon high- status
persons against addressing criticisms of
their own job to the lower sub-group and




4. The existence of a hierarchy produces
restraining forces against communicating
criticisms of persons at the other level.
Higher status seems to give persons greater
freedom to express whatever criticisms they
have of theflother level directly to the
criticized persons rather than to one's own
level.
(Kelley, 1951, pp. 55-56)
The results of the Kelley experiments bear direct re-
lationship to the findings of Arthur Cohen in 1958. Cohen
added the concept of power to that of status in his report
and thereby arrived at a more "instrumental" view of upward
communication. Cohen found that when a hierarchy is defined
in terms of status, people may attempt to maximize their sta-
tus in a variety of ways. They may misperceive their po-
sition, try to get psychologically closer to ^g^^iakf higher
status, not admit to anything that will call a desirable
status into question and so on. It would appear ^hat the use
20

of status does not specif iy dependence on higv s by lows.
By defining rank in a hierarchy in terms of power instead
of status, howeverij a functional dependence o^ lows upon
highs is created. An emphasis on power difference points
to the behavior of the lows toward highs in the interests of
need satisfaction, and not merely to their attempts to approx-
imate status in either fantasy or wish- fulfillment. Cohen
concludes that "those with low rank for whom mobility upward
is impossible have less need to communicate to upper levels
(Cohen, 1958)
in... a friendly, promotive, and task-orie ed,$! fas ion."
William Read (1962) examined the relationship between
upward mobility among executives and tested the accuracy with
which they communicate problem-related information upward in
industrial i*:;archies. Building on Cohen's e sis' on the
"instrumentality" of upward comunication (which is supported
by the findings of Hurwltz, Zander and lymovitch (1953)),
Read attempts to isolate variables which account for the ac-
curacy of upward communication.
One such variable is mobility « the mobility aspirations
of lower-status members in industrial organizations. The
major hypothesis of Read's study is that a negative relation-
ship exists between upward mobility of members of industrial
organizations and the accuracy with which these members com-
municate upward in the hierarchy. More specifically, it was
X^redicted that the stronger the mobility aspirations of the
subordinate, the less accurate would be his communication o^
problem-related information to his immediate superior. Read
21

revised his hypothesis by the degree that the relationship
between mobility and accuracy in communication would be modi-
fied by two conditions. ^h e3|Le conditions were "interpersonal
trust" of the subordinate for his superior, and the subor-
dinate's perception of the "influence" of the superior over
that subordinate's career. It was predicted that the nega-
tive relationship between mobility and communication would be
greater under conditions of low trust (of subordinate f or su-
perior) than under conditions of high trust. Also, it was
predicted that the greater the influence the subordinate per-
ceived in his superior (meaning the superior's position to
satisfy or thwart the subordinate's aspirations), the greater
would be the subordinate's tendency to withhold problemjJrelated
communication from such a superior. Read's experiment with
52 superiors and their 52 respective subordinates bore out his
hypothesis, finding it to be essentially correct. He concludes
that the variable of mobility remains relevan^^ but is mod-
ified with an influencing factor o r trust. An extreme con-
dition for barriers to upward communication in industrial
hierarchies would be present when a highly mobile subordinate




From the Structural mode of investigation by Bavelas and
Leavitt came a steady procession of experimental studies on
communication as an organizational process. Gradually, the
studies included not only the patterns' effects upon the
22

communication process, but the behavioral aspects of the
persons involved in the communication network. Some research-
ers emphasized the latter; it is these studies which will nci
be reviewed.
The research conducted by Cohen and Read (see above) can
be thought of as a "bridge" between the organizational studies
and the behavioral studies. Their efforts were hinged on the
earlier work of Bavelas and Leavitt, but introduced variables
into the communication net -- the variables of influence,
trust, perception and status.
James Loomis (1959> examined the establishment of a co-
operative relationship based on interpersonal trust and how
communication would be used to establish trust. Crucial to
the establishment of mutually perceived trust is the subject-
ive impression fiat the individual has o f each other member
of tie group. Tie individual must feel that the other person
is trustworthy, and that the other person is trusting. In
othe*~ vords, if tie individual perceives mutual trust, he will
cooperate in a corporate venture, otherwise he will not. Since
the experiment involved a game in which each player was depen-
dent on the other, it was expected that the subject would per-
ceive trust if he was aware of his dependency. If he did not
perceive trust, he would not cooperate; if he did, he would
cooperate. By the method of note-passing, the players commun-
icated their intentions to one another. By far the most
striking feature of this experiment is that Loomis found per-
ception of what was communicated to the the most important
23

factor. Intention of the communicator was irrelevant if
it was not perceived by the receiver.
When communication is encouraged or allowed to take
place in only one direction, with no opportunity for feed-
back from the receiver in the form of acknoirfced ements, ques-
tions, or negative reactions, then accuracy in communication
is poor. Both sender and receiver will show low confidence in
(Loomis, 1959)
each other.
Leavitt and Mueller (1951) discovered that completion
of the circuit between sender and receiver (feedback) in-
creased the accuracy with which information is transmitted.
They also found that even though free feedback is limited to
the early phases of the communication process, considerable
improvement takes place in both accuracy of communication and
confidence between the two participants. Their findings sup-
port the hypothesis that free feedback is an aid to accuracy
in interpersonal communication. Free feedback seems to permit
the participants to learn a mutual language, which once
learned may obviate the necessity for further feedback. Addi-
tionally, the findings support the hypothesis that the pre-
sence or absence of feedback affects the sender-receiver re-
lationship. By experimenting under conditions which repro-
duced only the two extremes, the researchers found th^t zero
feedback is accompanied by low confidence and hostility; free
feedback is accompanied by high confidence and amity.
Jack Lyle (1961) conducted an experiment using four-man
teams in a news-story writing task. Communication structure
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and group atmosphere were studied in relation to group oral
communication, group morale, and productivity. He found that
deijiacratic groups tend to have a higher rate o f task irre-
levant communication than authoritarian groups; there "as a
trend for a similar relationship between group atmosphere and
the rate of task-relevant communication. Democratic groups
tended to work fastest when inter-member communication was re-
stricted, authoritarian groups with open communication. How-
ever, no relationship could be established between communication
structure and quality of productivity.
Lyle found that denial of opportunity for feedback was
related to lowered morale in democratic groups but not in au-
thoritarian groups. Lyle concluded that the editor (leader)
striving for both a democratic atmosphere and efficiency should
in some way curtail conversation among staffers (followers).
Further, the important thing seems to be that he should keep
open and active the channel between himself and his workers
in the interest of both productivity and employee morale. If
the work situation has a more authoritarian atmosphere, the
editor should maintain a different communication situation.
He should effect a balance; the more he talks with his workers,
the more he interferes with staff efficiency, the more staff
morale rises. The less he talks, the greater will be staff





I. HIERARCHICAL ASPECTS OF THE NAVY
Bureaucratic Structure
The great German sociologist, Max Weber, reviewed and
explained the concept of bureaucracy in its modern sense in
his work, Theory of Social and Economic Organization (1947).
Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy is founded on legal author-
ity, has a hierarchical structure, formalized rules, career
personnel, and norm Authority.
The U. S. Navy is an example of bureaucratic organiza-
tion, with its structure following Weber's ideal with faith-
ful accuracy. The formalistic pattern of organization in any
naval activity is prescribed by regulation. Its organization
chart shows a continuous series of official functions bound
by rules. Each position (or billet) has a definite sphere
o^ authority, specific task assignments and less specific "re-
sponsibilities" ($puch as morale, encouragement of educational
pursuits, sound administration, and so on.) Billets are
arranged hierarchically; that is, every officer or petty offi-
cer is under the direct supervision and control of a higher
one -- in Navy fitness report parlance, "reporting senior"!
The entire structure is commonly referred to as the "chain
of command", and includes the organizational framework and
specified channels of authority and communication.
Seniority




This chapter has been a review of pertinent experi-
mental studies concerned with the application of communica-
tion processes with organizational effectiveness and behav-
ioral variables. It has been an attempt to highlight some
of the contributions made to the understanding of why
communication is important to organizational health, how the
influence of communication can bear importantly on the rela-
tionships among people in groups, and what communication can
lend in the way of aid for problem- solving in groups.
There are many more such studies which support and elab-
orate on the points discussed here; however, lack o f space
prohibits discussing their contribution. This eclectic re-
view is undertaken to show the reader the place of importance




withi^i a bureaucratic organization depends upon merit,
seniority or both. The Navy uses a system which basically
depends upon seniority, but upon merit within certain speci-
fied zones of jjjeniority. Selection boards for officer pro-
motion choose from seniority-eligible persons; examinations
determine which eligible enlisted personnel shall be advanced
to the next pay grade. Here also, "eligible" refers to those
wita specified time in service.
Seniority also means the extent of authority within the
Navy's structure^of rank and precedence. In the hierarchy,
it is a system of positions which are defined by rank. In
effect, each position is graded as to what rank of officer or
what pay grade of enlisted person shall f ill *the portion.
Standardization
Much of the heart o$j bureaucracy is its routinization
and standardization. There is precedent, regulation, or a
mixture of the two into some authorized decision which is
followed on every new action. Nothing is left to chance; no
officer ever really plays his role "by ear". It may be said
that military administration has as a goal the creation of a
set of formal rules and written directives which establish
policy for every conceivable eventuality. Janowitz (1959)
writes of an incident in World War II in which General
Siseniower confirmed the death sentence of an Army deserter.
In so doing, he followed a pattern set forth in an Army ||anual
which prescribed each detail. The impressive feature o f this
act was that it was not only the first case of its kind in
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World War II, but the first since the Civil War. Nevertheless,
each procedural detail was painstakingly described -- down
to the issuance of the "traditional" blank cartridge.
Specialization
By subdividing the task responsibility in the Navy,
Weber's idea of specialization for utilization of technical
knowledge) is achieved. In the Navy, specialization is cate-
gorized by groups and even corps. Aviators, submariners,
supply officers, civil engineers, physicians, nurses are all
examples of the speciali: <&A ficers in the Navy. In addi-
tion, the modern Navy is developing weaponry, and other ?o-
phisticated devices for warfare so that a series of sub-
specialities has grown up within the past decade. For officers,
sub-specialization takes effect in such fields as comrnunica-
tions, intelligence, various types o^ engineering, training,
personnel administration, meteorology and other categories.
The pressures of advancing technology have forced sub- speciali-
zation to take on a dominant role in all naval personnel's
careers. Enlisted personnel have a rating structure which is
a ref lection- of the special tasks required in the Navy. The
ratings are even further differentiated by special codes
(NEC) signifying the extra skill or training the man has rela-
tive to his work.
In his precept to the 1964 selection board meeting to
recommend eligible officers for promotion to the rank of
commander, Secretary of the Navy Nitze stated: "It, of course,
continues to bo of i'u 1_ lost importance to select commanders
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who have demonstrated outstanding performance in operational
billets; however, from a^nng those who have demonstrated
this capability, we must give increasing emphasis to compe-
tence in technical and management responsibilities."
By specifying the type of officers the Navy wants to
lead its forces, Secretary Nitze sums up the current philos-
ophy of the organization he heads. Each officer is encouraged
to find a sub-special ty > and perfect it in order to find maxi-
mum participative opportunity during his career. This line
of reasoning flies in the face of tradition for the Navy,
since it was long preached that the general line officer was
supposed to pursue a varied experience career ar><f thereby
become"well-rounded". Modern technologic has forced a change
in this policy and the search of the selection board for of-
ficers who are primarily command potential, and sub- specialists




With increasing complexity, further specialization and
elaborate hierarchical structure, interpersonal skill is re-
quired of those who must operate within the framework provided
by the Navy. In 1954 a sample of approximately 576 Army,
Navy and Air Force officers on staff duty in the Pentagon were
asked the question, "Generally speaking, do you feel that sub-
stantive knowledge or interpersonal skill is more important
in your type of work?" The results reveal that, for officers
from all three services, the higher the administrative level.
I (Janowitz, i960)
the greater the emphasis on interpersonal skills.
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Commanding officers, charged with operational duties
ranging over an entire spectrum of skills, cannot afford to
neglect the technique of managing people, for it is people
who will ultimately mean the difference between accomplish-
ment of his mission and failure. Janowitz has noted that a
definite shift from domination to manipulative and persuasive
methods has taken place within the military establishment
since the Korean War. These methods involve the relative
balance of negative sanctions versus positive incentives.
Domination is defined as issuing orders without explaining the
goals sought or the purposes involved. (This was the spirit of
the charge of the British Light Brigade.) Manipulation implies
ordering and influencing human behavior by emphasizing group
goals and by using indirect techniques o f control. While the
terms manipulation and persuasion have come to be thought of
as morally reprehensible, they describe the efforts o* organi-
zational management when orders and commands are issued and
the reasons for them are given. The objective of the ef$fc»
fective military manager is not to eliminate difference in rank
and authority. Instead he seeks to maximize participation in
implementing decisions at all levels by taking into considera-
tion the technical skills and interpersonal needs of all con-
( Janowitz, 1960)
cerned.
-v II. INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION IN THE NAVY
Distribution of information to the hierarchy is the
task of the interpersonal communication network in any given
naval organization. Tie formal chain of command prescribes
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the proper flow of information; from the informal organiza-
tion evolves the actual communication network's pattern.
Tne formal communication pattern is similar to the wheel
shape designed by Bavelas (see Chapter II). This pattern calls
for subordinates to report to a single superior, he to another,
and so on up through the chain of command. Each position in
the nierarciical scale has a description of duties and expli-
cit (sometimes implicit) directions concerning the nature,
content, and direction of the communication effort which is
considered necessary for the performance of the tasks of the
position.
No responsible writer can devise an optimal communication
system for any and all organizations. Each system is a function
of the specific needs of the individual group and its tasks.
The Navy, because of its formalized structure based on rank
and position, has set up an intricate series of links in its
interpersonal communication network. This network follows the
authority and work relationships. For example, the seaman
does not go directly to the commanding officer without going
through the chain of command p±escribed for him. This involves
a series of permissions from his superiors all the way from
the petty officer for whom he works, his division officer, the
department head and the executive officer. The same pattern
is followed by each of the individuals aboard any ship or
station. The people occupying the positions in the hierarchical
ladder at a particular time are the only things that change.
This is an important factor in the formal network of communica-
tiin, for the stability of any organization depends largely on
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tion in that it permits a certain latitude in operation
within tie formal structure, and allows for personality vari-
ations that cannot be reflected in the formal organization.
The individual coming fresh to a naval activity wisely
learns the informal communication pattern; he must, to be
effective in his job. Being mostly unspecified, the rules of
the informal communication channel are learned by experience
and example.
Personal communication is included in the informal
communication category. It is not the essential business o^
decision-making information being passed along the line, but
such things as rumor, gossip ("scuttlebutt") and shop talk.
Speed is the essential feature of any set of informal per-
sonal communication linkages; reliability is, unfortunately,
not.
In order to be effective, the incumbent in any position in
the hierarchy must use both levels of the communication net-
work. It cannot be estimated the amount of informal communi-
cation necessary for the smooth functioning of any naval acti-
vity. Use of the informal channel before setting in motion
the apparatus of the formal channel will serve to facilitate
speed, efficiency and accomplishment of the specific task at
hand.
Upward Communication
Basically, the direction of flow of communication in the
Navy is three-way. It is downward in the form of policy,
directives, orders and amplifying information from superiors to
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how ^moothly the communication net functions. If there was
mass confusion and disruption of duties every time another
individual was replaced, the effect would be to paralyze
the organization. As it is, whenever the billet changes hands,
the billet's new occupant is considered to have the same in-
formation his predecessor did -- or at least access to the
source of that information.
The formal communications channel is the explicit level.
At this level, one finds published organization charts, stand-
ing operating procedures, formal orders and directives, for-
mal periodic reports, and so on. The substance of messages
communicated at this level is marked as being, officially, pi
matter for the record. Being explicit, and having the aspect
of being legalized, communications at the formal level in the
Navy tend to be somewhat slow in their development and passage
through a large naval activity. To the outsider, the formal
aspect of the communications within a unit is the most apparent,
but the importance of formal networks of communication is over-
shadowed by that of the informal.
The informal communication channel is the level at which
activities and attitudes are much less explicit. It is char-
acterized by the union of unattached links in the formally-
oriented patterns of communication. These linkages are usually
related to certain subjects or actions. The informal communi-
cation channel follows the general pattern of the overall in-
formal organization and is the fuel which motivates it.
Informal communication is a necessity to any structured organiza-
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subordinates. It is horizontal in that peer ^position in-
cumbents discuss information received, compare action decisions
and evaluate in a coordinative or personal way. It is upwa rd
whenever feedback reaches a superior from a subordinate. This
can be the formal method of reports required by regulation, or
it can be an informal conversation, or an oral briefing of a
senior by his staff.
The basic consideration for this paper is the flow of in-
formation from subordinate to superior in the Navy — upward
communication — and what blocks the free flow of this informa-
tion.
The Navy encourages upward communication -- not only o f
the formal report variety, but also the less formal, as measures
of control. It is a device necessary for comnand to steer the
proper course. The commanding officer is not omniscient; he
needs feedback from his personnel on lower levels of the unit
in order to evaluate his programs, his methods and himself
as a manager and a leader.
The ti^meostatic principles of cybernetics discussed in
Chapter I can be used to describe how upward communication
serves as feedback for control. If a commanding officer sets
a policy which is unpopular with his crew he will shortly find
this out if his two-way communication network is operating
effectively. Many naval officers seem to have the opinion that
it is unnecessary for subordinates to like policies handed
down from superiors; orders must be obeyed. Obedience to orders
is not all of the story, however. Sensitivity to morale
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conditions is one o* the earmarks o f a good leader. Unless
upward communication channels o*" the informal variety are kept
clear, the officer at the top is deprived of the feedback neces-
sary for making any needed adjustments.
Another purpose of upward communication is to create an
atmosphere of appreciation and loyalty stemming from a feel-
ing of participation by the personnel on lower levels. Sug-
gestion systems in industrial hierarchies are encouraged for
this reason. This is not to propose that naval personnel be
asked to contribute policy guidance for the Navy; only that
a wise superior will be amenable to ideas from his fctjlbordinates
whenever the opportunity presents itself. A recent example
is Secretary of the Navy Nitze»s soliciting direct correspond-
ence on retention ideas from officers and sailors.
From upward communication it is discovered whether subordi-
nates get the meaning from downward communication that is in-
tended by the superior. It is highly unlikely that a subordinate
left completely to his own interpretation will understand a
directive or an action just as the originator intended it. In
the first place, an officer, or any supervisor, may phrase the
message vaguely or ambiguously. Second, the receivers of the
messages may interpret even the clearest communication in the
light of their own biases or experience. The only way it becomes
clear as to which messages got through with which interpreta-
tion is for subordinates to relay back to superiors the in-
terpretations and reactions to what is said and done.
With a basically authoritarian structure in the Navy, it is
imperative that the views and influence of subordinates be
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given airing. Operational decisions will not be decide*,
by vote of the majority, but the very fact that the Navy\
such emphasis on the authority of superiors and the unquestion-
ing obedience to orders makes participative democracy in other
matters more essential.
One particularly military form of upward communication is
discussed by Janowitz (1959). This is the "oral briefing",
and is considered to be part of the decision-making process
and strictly military in origin. The briefing can be formal
or informal; it can put a relatively junior officer in the po-
sition of influencing the decisions of his seniors. The oral
briefing is a rapid and flexible means of upward communication,
permitting a more or less informal exchange of information.
Host briefings include a variety of questions from the senior
directly to the individual responsible for details involved in
the decision-making process, thereby bypassing the chain of
command to a large extent. By |»this free flow of information,
bottlenecks are avoided and the senior can be fully advised.
Janowitz (1959) further states that all organizations
have hierarchical systems which impede the upward flow of com-
munications and force reliance on informal communications. It
is possible that the military requires more eli$&ea.te devices
of bypassing immediately hig'ier authorities. The question also
arises whether the procedures by which subordinates control
access to the "old man" are sufficiently flexible to permit an
informal upward flow of communications. The tendency in all
organizations is to protect the chief executive from being
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unduly bothered; in the military, because of the clear-cut fea-
tures of rank and hierarchy;, informal access to higher-ups can
be greatly reduced.
The Navy has aoother avenue of upward communication which
is a way personnel may appeal directly to the commanding offi-
cer if tney have a grievance. This is known as the "Request
i
viast" for enlisted men and involves the right to be heard by the
commanding officer. T.ie procedure is guaranteed by the U.S.
Navy Regulations ; "The right of any person in the naval service
to communicate with the commanding officer at a proper time and
place is not to be denied or restricted."
The Request Mast is used as a resprt by men who feel that
the commanding officer is not receiving a full report from his
staff officers concerning a situation involving one man or even
a group of men. By so instituting this form o f hearing, the
military ensures a formal channel accessible to all and any within
the hierarcn.". Officer personnel have the same right, of course:
mast proceedings are not used.
III. BARRIERS TO UPWARD COf-ifrUNICATION
Just as interference in the transmittal of a message in
a mechanical communication device produces "noise" in the system,
so also is interpersonal communication bes^fcs^ with noise. Several
causes of noise are evident in the communication process. Some
are underlying and fundamental to the entire network within an
organization; some are pertinent to specific linkages in the net-
work. This section will be devoted to the discussion of those bar-
riers which are specifically (but not exclusively) oriented to im-
peding the upward -flow o^ information within the Navy.
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Basically the Navy has provided adequate organizational
channels for communication both up and down. In fact, Bavelas'
experiment and Leavitt's studies of communication net's showed
that more efficient communication exists in hierarchical organi-
zations than under laissez-faire conditions (see Chapter II).
Structure in an organization seems to help the flow of information,
but barriers do exist even where communication nets are most ade-
quate. These barriers may be classified roughly in two categories:
those resulting from organizational situations, and those imposed
by the interpersonal relationships, personalities and attitudes of
the individuals involved in the communication process.
Organizational Barriers
The nature, dynamics, and functions of an individual command's
organization may be an important barrier to the effective or effi-
cient communication of information. Often tehe effect of the or-
ganization on the members produces barriers. Most relevant to this
paper are the following types o^ organizational barriers.
Military restraint . Manv times in a military organization the
directing of upward communication of a critical nature is consi-
dered inappropriate. The natural hesitancy to criticize the boss
is accentuated in the Navy because of the emphasis on rank and
'authority. For instance, in recruit training as well as officer
candidate training, the individuals are "homogenized". This
process affects beiavior, sentiments, and for the time being,
status. The newcomer to the Navy is meant to feel reduced to a
level where he is equal to his classmates, but to no one else.
Tradition demands that he be inculcated with the respect (even
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awe) for the rate/rank structure in the Navy, and that the sanc-
tity of the system is never to be questioned. To be sure, the
indoctrination period dwells heavily on traditions, custom, pre-
cedence, rank and general orientation. But this is because the
individual is making a tremendous leap from the fairly unstructured
life of a civilian student ^usually) to the highly structured en-
vironment of the Navy.
Once out of the sheltered life of the indoctrination
period, the Navy expects and enjoins each member to make his way
up the ladder as rapidly as possible. It is not unusual, however,
for tae effectv,of the indoctrination to remain with the newcomer
for some time and even mold his thinking and actions for the dura-
tion of 'lis stay in the Navy. Some natural resistance is bound
to be encountered by any officer expecting an open channel of up-
ward communication in a group o f newly-arrived seaman apprentices
or ensigns. The writer has heard it expressed many times that the
greatest shock to the new enlisted man is the transition from
"boot camp" to his first duty station. It is largely because of
this different emphasis that this is true. To some naval per-
sonnel, "gold braid" conte&tvti«B« *o frighten and be a source o f
anxiety for their entire military career. To feel free to ex-
press oneself in such an environment would be unusual.
ir'ower and status relationships . The superior- subordinate rela-
tionship has a direct effect on the flow of communication within
the Hierarchy of any organization. Numerous steadies have shown
that the subordinate tends to filter out o f his communication with
nis boss all information which would serve to make the boss look
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bad. Even neutral information is distorted so that it appears
as good news to the superior. Information filtering is done
(Planty and Machaver, i960)
both wittingly and unwittingly.
Cohen's (1958) study of upward communication in hier-
archies concluded that when rank is defined in terms of power or
control over need satisfaction as well as general status, those
with low rank who can move upward communicate in a way guaran-
teed to protect and enhance their relations with the highs who
exercise that control. Whereas those with low rank in the organ-
ization for whom mobility seems impossible 'Save less need to




Power, as expressed in the rank structure of the Navy,
would be perceived as control by juniors of their seniors. The
research seems to indicate that perceived power is the key to this
attitude of willing Upward communication for those in a position to
move up in the chain of command. This would apply to officers who
may be trying to "impress" the commanding o r ficer or any superior.
Whereas this would not appear to be true for enlisted personnel
who do not have upward mobility aspirations and who, in the tejpms
of Cohen's study, do not need to communicate to the upper (officer)
echelons. It is more common to find that enlisted men have a more
willing attitude to communicate to senior enlisted, such as chief
1
petty officers. Since the encouragement of upward communication
from all levels of the command is desirable and necessary, it
would appear that skillful officers will depend on this top layer
of enlisted personnel for communication support.
Likewise, it should be noted that the eager communicator
may be passing on irreleMg^f or faulty information simply at
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the urging o 1" the need to communicate. Kelley (1951) states that
irrelevant content to communication is postulated to serve the
function of permitting the occupant of an undesirable position to
escape from it. It may also be that communication serves a<3 ;
-
1 ?'
a substitute for real locomotion to low-status people who exhibit
some desire to move up.
Another barrier in the organization is related to the
hierarchical position of an individual who becomes a "power cen-
ter". The power may be personal, but the position in the organi-
se
. .
zation is the manner in which it is acquired. It may be legitimate
as with the administrative officer or executive officer o f a com-
mand. Power involves the ability to influence someone to make de-
cisions in a certain way or even behave in a special way. Someone
who has been around the command such a long time that he is the
only one who "knows the ropes" is an example of this t^pe of pow-
er. Many times "ownership of information" is encountered in this
situation of power. The individual uses communication as a weapon.
March and Simon (1958) say the communication of an organization
enters at specified points. Here information is screened by an in-
dividual and passed on in the perceptual terms of that person. What
passes on in the network very often is the judgment of the filter-
ing individual, and not the facts. This could be a severe barrier
to the passing of communication up to the commanding officer in
the typical Navy unit if power centers are not controlled.
Mechanical . The final organizational barrier to upward
communication is the lack of any mechanical means for getting sub-
ordinates' views, opinions, reactions and so on. In the Navy this
problem can be too easily ignored since the organization channels
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provide adequate access. Jowever, they are only adequate if
publicized by the command and individuals are encouraged to use
them. Such means as rumor clinics,, a ques t ion- and- ans^p: section
to the Flan-of-the-Day
.
and adequate person-to-person interviews
at fitness report and enlisted evaluation periods can all be
utilized for the mechanics of getting the word from below to the
chief executive.
Interpersonal Barriers
While the barriers just discussed are in a sense inter-
personal barriers to upward communication, they arise from the
nature, dynamics and functions of the organization itself. There
are, however, additional barriers which come from interpersonal
contacts and influences outside any obvious context of the
organization.
Evaluation tendencies. Carl Rogers (1952) considers the
major barrier to mutual interpersonal communication to be the nat-
ural tendency to judge, to evaluate, to approve (or disapprove)
the statement of the other person or the other group. In any com-
munication situation where there is an emotional response involved,
the climate is not one which will breed accurate perception. For
example, in the area o f upward communication, let us say that a
seaman expresses dissatisfaction with some duty he may have. If
his division officer interprets this as being the typical "gripe"
of a malcontent, he may be thwarting some very valuable informa-
tion concerning attitude , morale, or other real problems in the
command. In this situation, the division officer is discounting
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the ability of the seaman to be the judge of anything, much Less
a matter which might concern change for improvement. His eval-
uation, therefore, becomes a block which impedes upward communica-
tion.
Perception . People's perceptions are determined by their
needs. Children from poorer homes, when asked to draw a picture
of a quarter, draw a bigger than actual one. Personnel, when
asked to describe the people they work with, talk about their
bosses more than about their fellow workers. This is fjrue because
(Leavitt, 1964)
their bosses are more important to their needs
j
A
seaman magnifies a compliment from the commanding officer, or even
his chief; but he also magnifies a word of disapproval.
Selective perception can exist to a large extent in the
process of interpersonal communication. Selective perception is
described by Leavitt as the process of picking out the pleasant
or filtering the unpleasant. For example, one may find it easier
(Leavitt, 1964)
to wake up to go fishing than to keep a dentist's appointment*
Being unaware of perceptual differences can create a severe barri-
er to /upward- coitinunicatioh. VPhk commanding o^icer who views a
remark made by a junior officer as critical may find that the
junior meant to say something entirely different. (See Chapter
II regarding Loomis ' study.)
It has been said that the communication process involves
sending and receiving of messages. It should be remembered, how-
ever, that encoding and decoding occur at either end of the cir-
cuit and that receiving an accurate message depends wholly on
the functioning of these processes plus noise interference. In
the interpersonal communication process, a similar procedure is
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found. The communicator (sender or transmitter) first forms
the message in his thoughts, next searches for the words which
will properly express the thought he means to convey. The suc-
ceeding step is to transmit the message in this code (words).
The receiver hears the words , and decodes them for meaning. The
final action is the feedback to t'ie transmitter in the form of
a facial expression, answer or gesture which indicates what was
actually perceived to be the message £y the receiver.
Interpersonal trust. Read's studies of upward communi-
cation (see Chapter II) pointed out the importance of interper-
sonal trust in the relationship between subordinate and superior.
If a subordinate trusts his superior, it will act as a modifying
influence in the communication o r unpleasant or unwelcome infor-
mation to the superior. Low trust of a superior strengthens the
tendency of particularly ambitious subordinates to withhold or
(Read, 1962)
in some way to prevent accurate upward communication.
This points out a barrier to upward communication in the
Navy. If a person in any supervisory role in a naval activity
acts in a unpredictable or arbitrary way when subordinates pass
on bad news, the trust of the superior by the subordinates will
be lowered. If an individual '"eels fhat all he wil'I $receive
for his efforts is a severe reprimand
s
or a tirade, he will be
inclined to withhold information which is likely to produce this
behavior. I f a superior cannot tolerate any criticism, he will
not hear criticism because his own behavior threatens his sub-
ordir.'^tSlfci.
Listener's attitude . A negative attitude toward the com-
municator, or toward the content of the message will likely
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cause ttie i&te^ided receiver t^ |$Aunderstand , or perhaps to
ignore, the message. Also, the attitude of the receiver toward
himself is another measure of how accurately he will be able to
understand the information given to him.
Disinterest, dislike, suspicion, all cast a barrier in the
way to ftjuitful upward communication. When a junior is communi-
cating with his senior, if the senior does not agree with the
junior's views, he may reject these views. This causes a dis-
ruption in the communication process at that point and the lis-
tener may not "hear" another word.
toor listening habits. When upward communication is initi-
ated at the lower levels of the hierarchy, it must pass through
several levels to reach the chief executive. Many barriers stand
in its way; one of the most common is that o f poor listening^
Nichols and Stevens cite three major reasons as to why poor lis-
tening contributes to the failure of upward communication:
1. Without good listeners, people do not talk freely;
therefore the flow of communication upward is seldom
set into motion.
2. However, if the flow should start, only one bad
listenfec/.is needed to stop the movement toward the top.
3. Even if the flow should continue to the top, the
messages are likely to be badly distorted along the
way.
(Nichoi.s and Jteverc, 1957, p. 150)
Listening, with understanding, opens communication channels.
It increases the subordinate's self-respect because he is re-
spected by the superior. By the superior respecting the subord-
inate enough to listen to him and make sure that he realizes this,
the respect for the superior by the subordinate grows. Thus
understanding is more likely to occur and influence by the
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subordinate is gained. Even if the content of the conversation
is rejected by the superior., the buildup o f respect and trust
is aided by sympathetic Listening and further and future com-
munication is encouraged.
Cultural and Language barriers . In a study of the effects
of social class on communication,Schr tziusn .^nd Strauss (1^55)
found that differences in modes of communication are more than
differences in intelligibility
s
grammar and vocabulary. Dif-
ferences are found in the number and kinds of perspective,
ability to take the listener's role, use of classifying or gen-
eralizing terms and devices of style to order and implement com-
munication. These findings indicate that it is incumbent on the
class group with the more highly developed communication abilities
to display greater understanding;, more patience and skill in prob-
lems of upward communication with members o f any group with less
developed abilities.
In the Navy, as a broad generalization, the officer group
could be equated to the higher social class and the enlisted group
to the lower. Advantages of education and social advantage, as
well as status and endowed power for most officer personnel tend
to support this.
It is obvious that if an enlisted man does not understand
the words or ideas of his officers, he will feel a deep chasm of
psychological distance between himself and them. Consequently with
a feeling of distance it will become increasingly difficult for
him to want to communicate with them. Officers, quite unwitting-
ly, use sophisticated words and phrases which confuse and dismay
the lower-rated enlisted man. In a defensive way, the man will
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withdraw and become silent -- often in resentment.
IV. ELIMINATION OF BARRIERS AND STIMULATION OF UPWARD
COMMUNICATION
Essential in the two-way communication process is the disco-
very and removal of barriers which impede the flow o f upward com-
munication. In the preceding section, the discussion has been
centered around w^at barriers were aAd jjj$w t^ejj came to be barriers
This section will deal with the elimination of the barriers and
stimulation of effective upward communication.
First and foremost, the naval leader -- whether Officer or
petty officer -- must be persuaded of the value of upward communi-
cation and make an effort to learn at what points in the organi-
zation to expect it. They must include in their thinking about
leadership and morale within a naval activity the idea of upward
communication being a tool which is essential for control pur-
poses.
The commanding officer should be aware of potential troubVe
spots in his organization with respect to communication barriers
between him and his men. He must provide the means whereby the
men of his command can express themselves in less formal envir-
onments than the work situation. Ships and Stations can use the
methods of all-hands picnics, sporting events or other social
activities as vehicles for the stimulation of informal upward
communication. If the officers of a command attend these ac-
tivities and participate, the possibility of a more democratic
atmosphere can be realized. Enlisted personnel, especially, are




Another avenue to improved upward communication lies in
the use of supervisory personnel who ''ave proved to be especially
adept at listening to lower-rated personnel. These individuals
-- often the indigenous leaders of a group -— distinguished by
the trust they have engendered in their subordinates, can be
used as listening posts by the executive or even the commanding
officer. Frequent informal sessions with these personnel can
complete the information flow to the very top for evaluation.
Short circuits down the line can be minimized. It is important
to note, however, that extreme caution should be employed in
using such a device. The individuals who are chosen must not
be able to use this as a power device. Neither must they feel
that they are being asked to act as "squealers" — an interpre-
tation many enlisted personnel may make.
Senior officers in any command can urge their juniors to
develop a line of communication which will keep them advised of
the organization 11 s morale status. Good listening habits, "open-
door policies", adequate counseling and nondirective interview-
ing techniques can be pointed out as modes of encouragement to
communication. Froman, writing in ^Nation's Business (October,
1961), says that most businessmen spend seven out of ten work-
ing hours in giving or getting information. Of this, listening
takes 45% of their time.
Rumors, or as they are known in the Navy -» "scuttlebutt" --
should never be ignored. They are a symptom of malfunctioning
communication channels. If they are handled in the beginning,
they will be prevented from growing into serious morale hazards.
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Rumor clinics can be utilized at naval installations with great
success if properly instituted. Any rumor or question can be
submitted to a central box. The question mwst be answered
promptly and adequately by the officer in the command respon-
sible for the function about which the question is asked. This
includes the executive officer and the commanding officer, if
need be. The P Ian- of - the-Day , station newspaper or special
bulletin board can be used as the means for promulgating the
answers.
Finally, the attitude of the commanding officer must be
one of receptivity to communication. If his position on the im-
portance of communication is made known to the entire organization,
his example will do much to lead others to adopt the same atti-
tude. No weakening of discipline is necessary to pursue a vig-
orous campaign for the improvement of two-way communication.
V. SUMMARY
In this chapter, the interpersonal communication in the
INavy has been explored. The emphasis on upward communication as
the second partner in the two-way communication process is based
on the theory that it is the more neglected of the two. The
barriers to upward communication, mainly those attributed to
organizational functions and those of human behavior, have been
discussed. Information gained by the chief executive of the
activity from his subordinates can be used as a control factor
(feedback); barriers which interfere with the transmissi6n of





In this final chapter,, a brief summation of the gist of
the study will be given. In addition, suggestions for future
research which have arisen as a result of findings in this paper
will be set forth c How the study may be used by naval officers
and petty officers to enhance their communication skills and
the importance of upward communication to them as leaders will
be discussed.
I. SUMMARY OF THE STUDY
This paper has been written for the express purpose of
bringing together in one place the aspects of interpersonal
communication which could apply to organizational units of the
Navy. The problem outlined in Chapter I has been explored
through research of experiments and studies conducted in the
subject of communication at all levels. The theoretical back-
ground of communication in the fields of information theory,
cybernetics, semantics 9 and organization theory have been re-
viewed to show their importance. Any study of a communication
network necessarily involves some of these allied disciplines.
Studies made by scholars on interpersonal communications
range from the network concepts which operate in any organization
to the qualities of personality and character which facilitate
communication. These studies reflect the progress o^ knowledge
about communication as a function o^ groups of people. By apply-
ing the concepts explored in these studies to the individual




Upward communication especially, indicates the health of
the morale and participation of a group. In the final analysis
it is the chief executive of the organization who must decide
and define the patterns for upward communication. He must
recognize what barriers can exist and then specifically which
barriers are affecting his unit's network, tie must realize that
he is dependent on sources of information from below, even when
that information may be damaging to his ego, or contradict his
own prejudices. In the Navy, it is imperative that the two-way
communication process be kept lively and efficient. This paper
has pointed out some of the pitfalls and shown some of the w*vs
out.
II. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
In reading references for the preparation of this paper, the
writer was able to locate no study of interpersonal communica-
tion in the military situation. The present attempt to draw
together significant information and parallel situations in the
Navy is not to be construed as the only way of coping with com-
munication problems.
It would be a significant piece of research to study the
new patterns o^ communication emerging today in the bureaucratic
structure of the Navy. Perhaps there is more importance to the
objectives of the military in the modern world and the corres-
ponding forms of interpersonal communication than have been dis-
cussed here. For example, all hierarchies are not the same,
motive-wise. Do non-profit hierarchies react in the same way as
their opposite numbers in the profit-seeking community?
Another aspect would be the specialization which is being
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more intensely cultivated in the Navy in this decade. Speciali-
zation may bring about consequent changes in the structure o f
the Navy's organization. Perhaps upward communication will be
enhanced by the weakening of the traditional structured aoproach-
es to every situation. This is mere speculation; scientific
experimentation might shed light.
The effects of poor upward communication in the Navy's
organization would be another research topic tying in the leader-
ship concept with social skills. To speak about poor communica-
tion is not as effective as showing empirical evidence of cause-
and-effect relationships.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR T-1E USE OF THE STUDY
The Navy has implemented a massive leadership program in
order to emphasize the importance of personal attention to com-
mand and control in naval units. Tie skillful leader will use
interpersonal communication as a tool f or leadership. In an
authoritarian organization 9 such as the military, communication
often comes close to the one-way
s
superior-subordinate relation-
ship only. To cite Janowitz (1959), the manipulative, persua-
sive spirit of the modern military organization is more in keep-
ing with a democratic society. Buildup of interpersonal trust,
sympathetic cooperation and feelings of participation and loyalty
for a unit are better indices of command readiness than blind
obedience.
Related to the growing concern for leadership in the Navy,
there should be the same emphasis on the methods which indirect-
ly affect the conditions under which good leadership is found.
Communication skills
s
which are not taught in an explicit way
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in the Navy, must be recognized as a way in which conflict
and frustration can be alleviated. Too many naval officers
blame "the system" when personnel become disheartened and morale
sinks dangerously low. Far better to explore the causes of bad
morale and root them out. Any leader with an effective two-
way communication network in his o: 1: ati< r ind this ex-
ploring process easier.
It is not enough to simply state that all naval officers
are managers. Management techniques must be taught and their
value has to be appreciated. The present-day naval officer is
in some ways like a corporation executive; he is bound by the
same principles of all organization leaders. He must be not
only a technical and combat expert, he must practice persu&sion,
diplomacy, and negotiation.
On the other hand, he can never forget that the purposes
of his organization are very different from those of the business
man. The blending of the social-skilled manager and technically-
trained naval officer is a delicate process - sometimes taking
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